Introduction
Virtually every self-respecting development NGO or social action group today promotes the participation of poor and marginalized people in decisions and programs affecting their lives. Empowerment is the word of choice. Similarly, international agencies and donor groups are urging governments to carry out participatory governance, highlighting the benefits of accountability, transparency, efficiency and citizen participation. Even developing-country governments have come around to seeing -or saying they see -the advantages of bringing their more disadvantaged constituents into decision-making processes. This change in orientation over the past decades from authoritarian, top-down urban governance styles has not come easily. It stems from decades of determined community organizing among the urban poor citizenry, aided by NGOs and other concerned civil society groups. For the past 50 years thousands of urban informal settlers faced with demolition squads bent on forced evictions, have fought back with sticks, stones, and blockades manned by angry protesting crowds. Sometimes they win a stay of execution; other times, overwhelmed by baton wielding police and even tear gas, they surrender and "voluntarily" dismantle their rickety shacks in preparation for relocation to a distant out-of-city site usually devoid of income-earning opportunities. While today's informal settlers still encounter these assaults on their rights to housing and development, an increasing number are experiencing more enlightened postures on the part of government. The result: new partnerships of people and government.
In the Philippines, this shift stems in no small measure from over 30 years of NGO community organizing in urban informal settlements. The goal was to create autonomous, empowered people's organizations (POs), capable of asserting their rights. Although the institutional changes needed to sustain these positive changes in governance have come agonizingly slowly to over four million urban informal poor, observers are now seeing the beginnings of real improvements in urban poor people's lives. These have come about in fits and starts through land proclamations, titling or other forms of secure tenure and through improved basic services like health, education, clean water, sanitation, electricity, and information-dissemination. Infrastructure projects have fe atured paved roadways and pathways, bridges, and community buildings serving as early childhood, health or multi-purpose centers. And all this came about significantly because of the relentless prodding of the organized poor.
Given the more positive orientation and concrete action on the part of some national and city officials, organized community groups have tipped their more aggressive forms of demand, as in mass protests, pickets, and cell-phone text brigades toward dialogue and negotiation. Yet, they are always ready to stage a rally if officials move too slowly. Once recalcitrant city and national government officials, realizing now the weakness of the existing political/legal/administrative framework for genuine reform, now began to search for, experiment with, and put in place new pro-poor policy frameworks, laws and ordinances, and institutional structures, How communities or clusters of urban poor households gained the capacity to move from a passive to active stance is still not sufficiently understood. This lacuna stems in part from the relatively low priority given by NGOs and POs to documenting and disseminating information on their activities. More recently, academic social scientists, public administration professionals, research institutes, and NGO research units are actively recording and analyzing these crucial social processes for transformative development. This paper examines four Philippine cases of how once powerless urban poor groups have metamorphosed from a begging or requesting mode in dealing with officials and elites, to a demand mode that highlights poor people negotiating confidently with powerful figures as equals. On the government side, initial responses reinforcing the dole-out welfare recipient mode have shifted in favor of more consultative, even collaborative ventures with multiple partners. The evidence of this change of mentality and political will have emerged in the revitalization and creation of bureaucratic and political structures and procedures supportive of poor people's perspectives and peoplegovernment partnerships.
The case study presentations are followed by an analysis of community organizing processes and the resulting institutional structures that were created or modified by government as a response. These mutually reinforcing linkages have enabled once powerless urban poor settlers to make their voices heard in the corridors of power. Finally, some implications are presented as to how these reforms in people-government interaction may affect current and prospective international donor-government-NGO/PO multistakeholders.
Participation: Differential Understandings
While "participation" has long been a codeword in the lexicon of NGOs, POs, and most recently government, a common understanding of what "participation" entails has proven far more elusive. The diverse meanings of contending parties has led to confusion on all sides and added to distrust and disillusionment between civil society and government. Plummer (2000:52) illustrates the ambiguity in the context of urban services and infrastructure delivery, listing the varied articulation of "participation":
1. Manipulation: Government interacts with communities with a view to obtaining free labor, cost recovery, and political gain, keeping in mind also donor conditionality; improving people's lives is considered secondary or even ignored. 2. Information: Government announces its intentions to communities but controls the amount and type of information released; it does not encourage changes in its decisions. Its objectives aim to get services in place and used, achieve cost recovery, and minimize community resistance to plans 3. Consultation: Government favors community participation and group formation, organizes forums for feedback, promotes some capacity building on an ad hoc project basis; but it does little to institutionalize these processes. Its objectives, in addition to those in #2, are to enhance community ownership, project sustainability, efficiency, and target vulnerable groups 4. Co-operation: Government promotes community decision-making, some institutionalization of processes, and incipient community empowerment. Its objectives include those under #3 above, plus community capacity building and a degree of empowerment. 5. Mobilization by the community. Government accepts that communities control decision-making processes, responds favorably to initiatives defined by the community or encourages their controlling their own initiatives. Its objectives focus on community empowerment and community-mana ged service delivery, which in turn reinforces ownership, sustainability, efficiency, targeting vulnerable groups, and achieving cost recovery, all done by the community itself.
All five forms of participation occur in the Philippines, with wide variations across the NGO-government landscape and frequently even in the same community. Thus, government officials criticized for not engaging in a participatory process will emphatically state that they did in fact do so, citing a community consultation at whic h they outlined the steps to be taken in connection with a planned resettlement scheme. The community, on the other hand, will deny that participation took place, alleging that only community members favorable to the government were invited, or that only a few token groups were present from the community, or that the meeting in question featured oneway communication in which the government initiators dismissed as irrelevant the people's objections and counterproposals. Alternatively, the manipulative mode of certain government officials, so common in earlier non-participatory days, has after extensive organized community claim-making, been transformed over the years into more consultative or cooperative modes. These, however, still tend to fall into "best practice" listings in a sea of "worst practices" still favored by governance entities.
Other observers have described additional continuum-based approaches to participation, ranging from passive at one end, to catalyzing change in the social relations of power, at the other (KALAHI-CIDSS-KKB 2003) . One of the earliest formulations was Arnstein's ladder of participation, with non-participation (manipulation and therapy) lodged at the bottom rung as most exploitative and disempowering, tokenism (information, consultation, placation) occupying the middle steps, and citizens' power (controlling and empowering) surfacing at the top. Moser emphasized the important distinction between participation as a means of mobilizing people for desired outcomes, e.g. water supply or drainage, versus participation as an end in itself. In the latter case, participation becomes a process in which mobilized poor groups gain greater control over resources and regulative institutions, thereby fostering redistribution (Plummer 2000:3 ) . Fowler (1997:102) , on the other hand, concentrates on NGO relations with the community, citing functional stages in people-NGO interaction, namely: (1) NGO entry into the community, (2) partnering and building sustainability, and (3) planned withdrawal with sustainable impact.
A Philippine-derived continuum emphasizes the varying modes of participation utilized by community groups and government in handling, endorsing, or counteracting government-derived or community-initiated urban informal projects or actions. The emphasis here is on the locus of power and decision-making, that is, Who decides?: (1) "solid citizen" educated professionals, (2) local government leaders, (3) planners in ex post facto consultation with people, (4) planners in consultation with people from the beginning of plan formulation, (5) decision-making local boards with one or two people, and occasionally even half, representing the interests of disadvantaged groups, (6) decision-making local boards on which the mass of heretofore excluded people holds majority representation (Racelis Hollnsteiner 1977:14-15 ).
This continuum model flourished during the dictatorship period under President Ferdinand E. Marcos (1970-86) , when the rise of technocrats made modes 1-3 the prevailing choice of government. In contrast, community groups organized by grassroots NGOs opted and struggled for modes 4-6. The former embodied elite decision-making "for the people," while the latter sought genuine people-led decision-making aimed at shifting power relations in their favor. Given the belief in technocrat-led development and the authoritarian structure of the political process, the Marcos government did little (except for the Tondo Foreshore) about putting in place institutional structures to support, much less sustain, community initiatives modestly aiming for at least mode 4. People were only too well aware that threatened bureaucratic and elite interest groups could easily impute "Communist" leanings or Party membership to any groups that challenged prevailing governmental decisions or advocated modes 5 and 6 . The latter could easily lead to summary arrest, possibly torture and even "salvaging" (the Philippine term for "disappeared"). At the same time, a few resourceful POs backed up by their CO partners managed to come close to mode 5 and continued their advocacy toward mode 6.
With the "people power" overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship in 1986, in itself a triumph of civil society organization and networking, a new era of democratic openness opened up. The experience of community organizers and activist leaders, who had couched their Saul Alinsky conflict-confrontation mobilizing style in the martial law era under the safety net of the Philippine Catholic Bishops' liberal wing support of the theology of liberation and Paole Freire, would now inspire the creation of thousands of active, secular grassroots-oriented NGOs toward community organizing. This combination of open political space for POs and NGOs brought by a new democratic leader, President Corazon C. Aquino, and the participatory policy and legal frameworks she and her team put together, allowed civil society's engagement with instead of chronically against government (Racelis 2000:172-75 ).
These incipient partnerships evolved, however, with great caution and often consternation on both sides. Lingering distrust of government and fear of co-optation by the elite-oriented bureaucracy remained high among civil society groups. In the same vein, most government officials resisted ceding any of their decision-making powers to what they saw as uneducated, ragtag groups of poor people audaciously acting as though they had the right to expect, or even worse, demand certain prerogatives. High on the latter's roster of undesirables were the PO supporters -NGO "bleeding heart do-gooders" -or were they Leftists! The thought of sharing power became even more of an anathema to these government figures when poor people acted assertively rather than meekly respectful! Nonetheless, urged on by civil society leaders now occupying high government positions in the Aquino and Ramos Administrations (1986 to 1998), NGOs cautiously tested the government waters through "critical collaboration" For their part, bureaucracy officials slowly and often reluctantly, le gitimized increased power-sharing with people under the rubric of "good governance," a new buzzword on the development and donor scene.
Let us examine some actual cases of people-NGO-government interactive engagement to ascertain how once antagonistic and adversarial relations have metamorphosed into mutually supportive partnerships. These models illustrate the possible when poor people organize and government listens and responds positively. Yet, it must be recognized that these examples of participatory governance still represent exceptions more than the rule. Mutually rewarding and reinforcing partnerships still remain few and far between in a country of 85 million people, of whom an estimated 29 million (33.7%) -and probably more -fall below the poverty line (National Economic Development Authority 2003:2).
Getting to Participatory Governance: Case Studies

Zone One Tondo Organization (ZOTO)
ZOTO was formed in October 1970 on Manila's Tondo Foreshore, when 30,000 informal settler families, or180,000 people, were faced with impending demolition, eviction, and distant out-of city relocation to make room for a new container port. Some 65 community leaders representing 20 local organizations responded to the offer of the Philippine Ecumenical Council on Community Organization (PECCO) to help build a mass-based democratic organization powerful enough to resist outside manipulation and act on behalf of local people and their priority concerns. The first mobilization arose out of the aftermath of a severe typhoon that hit the community. Contributions were coming from donors as far away as Germany. Residents were convinced from long experience that if the relief items went through government channels, large portions were likely to be diverted for the personal benefit of officials and their cronies and followers in and outside the community rather than to the neediest.
PECCO community organizers quickly realized that they had a ready-made issue for arousing people's indignation, even anger, against corruption directly affecting. Motivating them to take action looked promising. ZOTO negotiated with the German donor to invest the entire $10,000 contribution in new galvanized iron sheets to replace the roofs blown away by the typhoon winds. The PO guaranteed that the supplies would have a delivery time of no more than two hours from the time they arrived at Slip Zero. Recipients in turn agreed that if they had not nailed their new roofs in place by the following day, they would forfeit the items to someone else for use. The scheme worked so well that a few days after the typhoon, the Foreshore was gleaming with hundreds of shiny new roofs.
ZOTO wrested a further concession from the German donor: the latter should shift all its emergency relief efforts henceforth directly to the PO rather than through the government. This was accomplished through a rally mounted again the relief agency in the elite neighborhood housing its office, much to the discomfort of well-to-do neighbors, and demanded that the German donor channel the relief goods directly to ZOTO rather than through the government. When the donor agreed, ZOTO went into high gear to sustain its record of fair, honest and efficient relief goods distribution. Given this track record, it subsequently initiated community actions that pressured government officials to take seriously people's protests against evictions, as well as their demands for land titles, jobs, water, health, and other basic services. It attracted increasing numbers of memberorganizations reaching 60,000 urban poor residents its first year.
ZOTO felt strong enough to hold its first convention seven months later, drawing 750 delegates, many of them women, coming from 52 organizations. Having mounted a number of mobilizations that targeted the appropriate government officials and wrested concessions from them, members now knew from experience who among their own ranks could handle the challenges of democratically leading and managing so large a federation. Formal elections of permanent officials, and the planning of a new constitution were thus timely. A year later, their second annual convention attracted 1,300 delegates from 85 organizations waving placards proclaiming their memberorganizations: Voices of the Poor, Organization of Men, Women's Association, Mothers' Sewing Group, Tenants Association, Sons and Daughters of Sweat, Lucky Teenagers, New Generation Circle, Organization of Protestors, Garlic Peelers Association, and many more. After two years of successful operation, ZOTO registered itself as a legal entity with a Constitution and By-Laws (Murphy 1972:1) Its long struggle for the land moved into high gear in the next two decades as the Philippine government obtained a World Bank loan that earmarked the Tondo Foreshore for port development and envisioned distant relocation for the 180,000 "squatters." Under pressure from ZOTO, the original government plan was substantially modified to highlight on-site upgrading with tenure security, and the acquisition of additional land and hous ing only a few kilometers away for those displaced by roads and other infrastructure development. This was the produc t of numerous PO-Government meetings, committee session, and an occasional rally when bureaucratic inertia set in. ZOTO members could track the trajectory, since the now sat on a number of committees organized by the Tondo Foreshore Development Authority.
Soon ZOTO members were joining training sessions in settlement planning, and financial and credit management, led by professional architect-planners and business experts invited through NGOs to contribute their talent pro bono in behalf of their community clients. Technical topics were demystified and members developed the knowledge, skills, and confidence to discuss, argue and negotiate with the authorities in complex areas of government planning. Friendly journalists reported sympathetically on the people's demands for security of tenure through land acquisition and housing and settlements improvement. They were impressed by ZOTO President Trinidad Herrera's speeches asserting that, "No Filipino should be a squatter in his own country," a slogan later co-opted by President Ferdinand E. Marcos as his. ZOTO added: "We are Filipinos. This is Filipino land… therefore the only squatters are the outside oppressors who have their own corrupt interests" (Murphy 1972:3) .
Hundreds of mobilizing and linked activities took place before the Marcos government grudgingly agreed in principle to the People's Plan calling for most of the residents to remain on-site. As General Gaudencio Tobias, who was in charge of the Tondo Foreshore Development Authority, admitted to this author many years later, "I commanded the Philippine Corps of Engineers in Viet Nam and believe me, I felt braver tackling hostile Vietnamese than I did facing strong and determined residents of the Tondo Foreshore confronting me on a local issue."
Participatory planning came in many guises. Community members sorted out varying levels of rights, using their criteria to ensure that the longest-residing owneroccupant families had higher priority claims to remain than, for example, recently arrived migrant renters. ZOTO drew on local knowledge to ascertain this, along with a review of the kinds of household receipts for electricity or water delivery payments that households could present as evidence of their tenure. Amounts and collection schemes for amortization payments were hotly debated. The possibility of leasehold for the first five years followed by land title issuance was proposed and accepted by the government as a viable option Those living on sites affected by port construction and road-building andwidening agreed to move voluntarily once those households were identified in the new Tondo Foreshore plan.. ZOTO claimed many victories in gaining government concessions in the 70s and 80s stemming from its effective organizing. Its non-violent mass protests centering around a local issue was a far cry from the more violent demonstrations mounted by Leftist parties aiming toward the overthrow of the government and the dissolution of private capitalism. After years of struggle, debate and confrontation, and with the strong urging of the World Bank, the government agreed to turn over the land to the residents as amortizing owners paying modest installments over 25 years.
A twin accomplishment was the government's willingness to develop Dagat-dagat as an overflow site, where people would also get rights to land and ready-made low-rise housing. Government trucks would transport the latter not to the notorious Carmona relocation site 40 km. to the south, but to Dagat-Dagatan, a rehabilitated fishpond site identified by ZOTO as suitable for a new landfill community. It could absorb with a minimum of strife the spillover families from Tondo eight km away-those on the roadways and adjacent to the new port -ultimately totaling 7,000 families. For the 20,000 who remained onsite in the Foreshore, government would initiate a slum upgrading scheme together with a reblocking process, build more schools and health clinics, install potable water systems, and provide livelihood opportunities. Ironically, the Parola Compound intended for port use and fenced off once its inhabitants had moved to Dagat-dagatan has since been invaded by 10,000 informal settler families, double the former population. Twenty-five years later, they in turn have resumed the struggle for land rights along the Pasig River.
The Foreshore and Dagat-dagatan communities stand out as tributes to participatory planning and development, all the more astonishing because their struggle took place under a martial law regime. Possibly the somewhat benign attitude was initially taken by the Marcos Administration because ZOTO was known to be affiliated with PECCO, an ecumenical group of Catholic and Protestant priests, pastors, nuns, and laity. Marcos avoided Church retaliation as much as possible. Moreover, because in the early years, ZOTO had avoided Marxist dialectics and related action, preferring PECCO's more peaceful philosophy of, "let the people decide," it looked comparatively non-threatening to the political set-up. The ideological balance had shifted by the late 1970s, however, as Communist-Party-linked National Democratic Front organizers infiltrated the Foreshore and trained new political cadres. PECCO moved its organizers to less violence-ridden areas
The 21 st century has seen a new and resilient generation take over the ZOTO leadership. It is pursuing a wide range of programs to access basic services, ensure gender equity, information and communication, good governance and non-traditional to which politics. Its area of coverage now encompasses members in 11 resettlement sites. (CAPWIP 2003: 3.) . Its first president, Trinidad Herrera, remains active in Dagatdagatan, as a local government (barangay) councilor. She is proof that partnerships between people's organizations and the government form more easily when NGO leaders move into the government bureaucracies, or when PO/NGO leaders win election to government posts. They help form the institutional arrangements needed for participatory governance.
Sama-Sama
Sama-sama (Joining Together) on Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City, the site of the National Government Center, was initially organized as a Basic Christian Community under the aegis of its parish priest in 1975. The shift from largely spiritual concerns to active fear of demolition and eviction, and chronic anxiety over their tenure insecurity gradually exposed the mostly women members to broader social perspectives. In the early 80s, the Community Organization of the Philippines Enterprise (COPE, formerly PECCO) was called in to help the people organize their resistance to eviction in non-violent ways, shore up their claim to land rights, and learn how to deal as equals with powerful officials (Murphy, Gerlock, Chiong-Javier, Dizon, and Quijano 2001:1-3) .
Again, despite the repression of the martial law years, Sama-sama managed to mount protest actions targeting those officials with the authority to respond to their demands. Since they were usually well prepared with their arguments, having gone through role-playing sessions with COPE organizers, and skilled at bringing in the media to dramatize their cause, government officials had to take note and ultimately make concessions. Marches to the housing authority or water district office gave them credibility by demonstrating to neighbors their willingness to struggle for the land and basic services rights of all the informal settlers in the National Government Center, not just Sama-sama members. They also showed concrete gains in securing regular supplies of potable water, streetlights, a day-care center, and land-fill for rutted streets and pathways. Deeper learning among community members was enhanced by the ratio of one community organizer to 700 families (Murphy, Gerlock, Chiong-Javier, Dizon and Quijano 2001:4-5) .
Aside from steadily resisting eviction and insisting on land titles, Samasama's greatest victory was the proclamation in 1986 by newly installed President, Aquino of 150 hectares of land to be turned over to their occupants. Moreover, Samasama was designated the official representative of the people in the NGC Development Committee overseeing the development of the 150 hectares (Racelis 2001: That was the beginning of a long struggle, however, only now reaching its conclusion17 years after the presidential proclamation. Government delays in obtaining the funds needed for the Commonwealth land reform program and plan for a commercial cross-subsidizing Control Zo ne along the highway prevented any upgrading and construction activities from getting underway. This hiatus in turn encouraged an additional 24,000 families, often supported by syndicates selling "rights" illegally, to settle in the NGC. The number of families jumped to 42,000 by 1994 and 60,000 by 2001, rendering obsolete the original People's Plan meant for 18,000 families in 1986.
No longer possible either was the goal of moving 9,000 families from the right side of Commonwealth across the street to the proclaimed area so that the government could use the vacated land for the originally intended government buildings. In retrospect, the organizers believe they should have spent less time in planning, and simply resettled the eligible families so as to claim the spaces before outside competitors with limited or no rights appropriated the land. To ready the households for the titling process, Sama-sama actively worked with the government to inform, survey and tag over 25,000 households eligible for a Certificate of Land Transfer (Murphy, Gerlock, ChiongJavier, Dizon and Quijano 2001:4-5) .
. While the land issue remained paramount, the leaders took steps to maintain organizational loyalty by involving the people in activities whose benefits could be readily seen. Sama-sama developed its own slum-upgrading program, which entailed voluntary reblocking to make way for drainage canals and wider roadways constructed on a self-help, voluntary labor basis. In the first pilot area alone, community improvement costs came to nearly PhP1 million, with urban poor residents contributing one-fifth of the cash input and nearly all of the sweat equity labor. City Hall furnished the cement and other materials, along with technical advice (Racelis 2001:17) . Some 22 neighborhoods benefited from a Sama-sama initiated scheme that allowed over 2,000 families to obtain a lease on the land they occupied, with the option to buy it after 15 years.
A saving cooperative of around 500 members contributing about PhP20 (4 US cents) a mont h rapidly increased its loan funds in a decade to PhP 1,000,000. Borrowers can obtain loans up to PhP10,000 ($200). Socially bonding activities coupled with fundraising have included an annual Valentine's Day party at a local restaurant complete with a Mrs Valentine beauty contest, participation in city-wide Lenten procession portraying Christ being beaten by his captors, and at Christmas-time the Holy Family's search for a place to stay. The messages, respectively, of oppression and "no room at the inn" resonate with poor informal settlers. A major source of income for the organization is the annual Christmas raffle, where wealthier friends and supporters contribute items like a 12 cubic foot refrigerator or television set as first prize, followed by a washing machine, a steam iron, smaller appliances, and gift checks to well-known restaurants.
Sama-sama had to go to the barricades again in 1993 when the Ramon presidency sought to build large numbers of medium rise buildings in their area (and all over Metro Manila) on sites designated for land transfers in the People's Plan. Because the funding for such an ambitious project and the insistence of NGOs that the poor for whom they were intended could not afford to pay the amortizations, the plan was ultimately shelved, but not before a few demonstration units were built in Commonwealth.
This was also the period when Sama-sama lost its right to represent the entire NGC on the government-community panel owing to the critical stance of the new Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Committee (HUDCC) Chair. He and his associates in fact undermined Sama-sama's authority further by installing competing local association heads on the committee in what appeared to be divide-and-rule tactics often favored by government figures. The resentment of barangay local officials at Samasama's success, factional fissures within NGC groups, rapid turnover of NGC project administrators, confusion as to which government housing agency handled community development loans and what procedures applied for loan releases all plagued the populace struggling to establish their land claims (Racelis 2001:18) .
Demoralization struck the membership starting from the time the government failed to respond to Sama-sama's objections about the rapid influx of new settlers and the suspicion that the police and city officials were in cahoots with the land syndicates. Internal management problems also afflicted the organization: fewer consultations between leaders and members, a weak set of second line leaders and male spouses objecting to the amount of time their wives were spending on community matters further complicated by jealousy of their interaction with other men. The murder of two Samasama leaders heightened tensions and disunity.
The organization weathered these storms with continuing pressure for the issuance of Certificates of Lot Entitlements, to be followed by Certificates of Land Transfers, or titles, upon full payment of the land. It joined coalitions with other informal settlers whose areas had recently been proclaimed by President Macapagal-Arroyo and before her, President Estrada. These newest claimants benefited greatly from Samasama's long experience in this field. Actual titles are now being issued not only to members but for all qualified residents of Commonwealth's 150 hectare proclaimed area. Sama-sama is once more being recognized by government-community committees as the leading and most knowledgeable organization on land titling and self-help development.
Pasig River Rehabilitation Program
The Pasig River runs through four Metro Manila cities and one town before emerging during high tide at Laguna de Bay, a tidal lake to the east, or at low tide at the opposite end in Manila Bay to the west. Once a major thoroughfare for boat traffic before the World War II, over the years it has become so polluted and filled with wastes and garbage that fish can no longer survive in its murky depths. In 1998, the Pasig River Rehabilitation Commission was established by the nationa l government as part of a 15-year development plan "to improve environmental management of the Pasig River basin within Metro Manila, particularly for wastewater management and to promote urban renewal." The first five years of the plan called for relocating several thousand informal settler families to decent settlements according to a set of strict guidelines prepared by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
The removal and relocation of informal settlers in the stilt houses on the riverbanks began in earnest in 1998 with some 5,000 poor families. The following year another 3000 were transferred to resettlement sites over 40 km away. To make matters worse, the government announced that it would enforce the 10 meter easement rule, which prescribed eviction for any household within that space-an estimated 10,000 families along the river. Part of the areas they would vacate would become ribbon parks and recreational areas, which would in turn stimulate commercial development.
Even though they were offered land and core housing in the resettlement sites, the vast majority faced great difficulties. Employment and other income generation activities were virtually nil, and skill-training programs largely ineffective as a means to finding new employment. Water taps were few and far between and the water often suspiciously dark and undrinkable. Electricity was limited, adding a security problem to the aea. Transportation out to the road remained scarce and the fare back to their earning places in the city unaffordable. The house itself was sometimes only a roof on four posts, awaiting completion by the new resident. Although the prospect of owning a piece land was thus enticing, too many settlers could not afford to live so far away from their livelihoods in the city. Alternatively, the family opted for a strategy of having the wife and the younger children remain in the relocation sites, while the husband and the school-aged children moved back to the city during the week to be near work and school. The woman feared, however, that if left to themselves in the city, the husband would find another woman and eventually abandon his family in the resettlement village.
To help riverside and adjacent urban poor communities assert their rights in the transfer and insist on better resettlement conditions, community organizers of CO Multiversity began working in the riverside communities. A series of mobilizations and dialogues by newly organized community groups, notably, the Powerful Alliance of Affected Families along the Pasig River (ULAP), led to their discovery that the ADB-PRRC plan shown to them had not highlighted the provision for a large slum renewal component along the river. This changed their entire formulation of their position. From then on, ULAP insisted that rather than move thousands of families to distant resettlement sites at great expense, the government should take steps to allocate the land to them or acquire adjacent land, followed by upgrading and housing schemes. Also under contention was the 10-meter easement, the product of a martial law era Executive Order that the riverbank dwellers challenged in court.
The media play an important part in adding to the pressures on government, especially when something especially dramatic happens. This became clear when a demolition team descended on Barangay Pineda to force the people out. The PO had asked the government to delay or cancel demolitions beyond the three meter easement line, and to recognize that in any case, the resettlement sites were not ready for this move. When the demolition crew arrived the people, along with the CO Multiversity and Urban Poor Associates organizers, had formed a line of resistance, placing negotiating tables with a statue of the Blessed Virgin in the way of the team. Community members were praying and singing hymns. The police waited for the prayers to end, then moved into the area to start the destruction. The scene was a media paradise. Some 300 demolition personnel were dismantling houses, protected by 35 policemen including SWAT teams, and fire engines, with an ambulance standing by. Soon a fight broke out between the crew and residents, culminating in the stabbing of a demolition worker.
The story made the headlines and attracted more television, radio and press reporters. PO members told the story of how the government had rejected their People's Plan, was forcing them to move to a resettlement site whose conditions did not meet minimum standards. The ADB's involvement gave further importance to the story, especially when officials visited the MMDA to inform them that the ADB would not support a resettlement program that included such violence, even if it was intended. The Senator of the Housing Committee visited the area to size up the situation, again drawing media attention. The struggle continued.
In the intervening five years, numerous meetings have taken place between ULAP groups and the national government. A Resettlement Committee set up by the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Committee Chair, a former NGO leader, featured regular meetings at which representatives of ULAP and other affected POs could raise their problems with national and local government officials in regard to resettlement-the location, timing, amortizing costs, transfer allowances, transportation, employment, water, sanitation, electricity, safety, and many such issues. This Committee lost its clout after the HUDCC Chair resigned owing to a disagreement with the President, and once the POs turned away from resettlement as their prime approach.
The results are still to be assessed for the entire Pasig bank residents, but a number of positive developments have taken place. The Pineda community on long abandoned railroad tracks in Pasig City has won its struggle to acquire the land, gone through a planning and reblocking process in order to start a Community Mortgage Program loan program for title acquisition. Punta Sta. Ana has convinced the PRRC to look seriously into purchasing an adjacent nine-hectare private property for low-rise housing accommodating even the 10-meter easement dwellers. If the land is not obtained, they intend to remain right where they are. Resettled families in the distant sites have managed to pressure the authorities to make good some of their promises in response to the people's demands. And the 10-meter easement is now being discussed in government circles, with the likelihood that it will no longer be enforced.
Playing a key role here has been the Asian Development Bank. It anti-poverty stance over the past few years, promotion of participatory governance, and stringent guidelines for resettlement sites have had a strong impact on government policy. This is partly because the NGOs and POs involved have built fairly strong bonds with ADB project personnel and quickly convey complaints about government handling of the situation to them. While the ADB has been generally cautious about "taking sides" vis-à-vis the government, its progressive approach encourages much greater flexibility in the conceptualization and implementation of ADB-funded projects like the PRRC. As for national and local government officials, most have learned a great deal about participatory governance, starting with listening to the people's views and desires. While Mayors and national officials continue to resist these voices, others have shown their interest in carrying out more such projects with maximum benefit to poor people.
Naga City Urban Poor Federation
Naga City, founded in 1575, is a medium-sized city of 96 sq.km located 400 kms south of Metro Manila with a population of over 140,000 people. The Bicol region of which it is a part is recognized as one of the poorest areas of the country. Soon after the people power revolution of 1986 that ousted President Marcos and brought in President Aquino, COPE organizers began working with several urban poor groups occupying land adjacent to abandoned railroad tracks. The issue immediately before them was the scarcity of clean, potable water in the community. Several meetings, unsuccessful visits to the old Mayor, and other pressure tactics, the people managed to get the local water district to install a tap. From this victory, they went on to address security of tenure and other basic services needs (Murphy ND) The elections of 1998 brought in young Mayor Jesse Robredo, who had strong socially-oriented leanings. When on day one, he found the urban poor and COPE organizers at City Hall waiting to discuss their issues with him. He immediately saw the value of joining with rather than fighting them. As he states (Robredo 1999:12) The best way for local governments to tackle poverty is to share the task with civil society. This means opening up the process of priority setting, decisionmaking and resource-allocation to representatives of civil society making them as much responsible as the officials of the local government.
Government need not give everything to the poor. The poor are more than ready to help themselves if only they are involved in the decision-making process early on. Government cannot do the task alone, insisted the Mayor. Accordingly, soon after he assumed office, he set up the Naga Socialized Program for Empowerment and Economic Development (SPEED), which provided multiple channels through which city groups could identify development priorities and their views on policy issues. Among these were neighborhood-level consultation, sectoral dialogues, city-wide referenda on major projects or policies, and surveys. Disadvantaged groups were brought into the priority setting and decision making process of the city government. Their inputs brought them a fair share of the annual budget. "Naga SPED put in sync people and government, an unstoppable synergy that focused resources towards uplifting the plight of its impoverished sectors.
A second major innovation was the Naga City Empowerment Ordinance, which institutionalized the Naga City People's Council (NCPC). This non-partisan body was composed of NGOs, POs, and private sector groups, who could propose legislation and carry out additional duties. Soon Council-designated NGOs were sitting on boards, councils, committees, task forces and other special bodies of the city government. The Ordinance also provided for representation in the city legislature of elected nonagricultural labor, women and urban poor.
"In essence, the Empowerment ordinance deconcentrated political power and shared it with civil society through non-government organizations and community leaders who participate in the various aspects of local governance. Equally important, it safeguarded public resources from being dissipated n politically attractive but developmentally irrelevant projects, …. (Robredo 1999:6) .
In 1989, the urban poor now organized into the Naga City Urban Poor Federation (NCUPF) promoted the adoption of the Community Mortgage Program in the city, the creation of the Urban Poor Affairs office, and the passage of the Comprehensive and Continuing Urban Poor Ordinance of Naga, or the Kaantabay sa Kauwagan Progam (Angeles . Mayor Robredo envisioned this Partners in Development Program as primarily empowering the 25 per cent of city residents who were informal settlers and slum dwellers. It featured on-and off-site development for poor urbanites to obtain land and improved housing. To help implement these programs, he readily acceded to the NCUPF's proposal for a separate urban poor window under the comprehensive livelihood program of the city government. There applicants could get loans for economic empowerment. A separate urban poor trust fund account enabled the accumulation of CMP fees, amortization for the resettlement sites and the sale of other government properties for socialized housing.
With the NCUPF as a close ally, 33 hectares of private and government-owned land have been turned over to 2,017 urban poor families, encompassing over half of them. A tripartite mechanism for settling land tenure issues between landowners and land occupants has been established. To reduce the migrant stream to Naga City from the surrounding area, the Mayor as created the Metro Naga Development Council, a partnership between the city and 14 surrounding municipalities, later joined by national government agencies and local NGOs. The framework is one of integrated area development highlighting urban-rural linkages.
The much-awarded Mayor invariably cites his indebtedness to Naga City's NGO and civil society partners for what is considered the best run city in the Philippines and one of the most vibrant in terms of citizen participation and satisfaction. Indeed, Mayor Robredo won the next two elections by an overwhelming vote. Genuine participatory governance is good politics and good politics gets good politicians re-elected. The community organizers and People's Organization for their part keep the government accountable and transparent by staying true to their educational and empowering processes of action-reflection-action-reflection. Naga City POs have learned to do this because COs take them through these steps:
At the same time NCUPF enga ged extensively in networking with other activist groups, participating in protest rallies and other mass actions spearheaded by different political blocs. Although its members recognize the value of having a socially aware and supportive mayor, they also know that they must keep the pressure on to ensure that ordinances are implemented, that funds are actually released, that important agreements achieved from the government by the urban poor sector need to be protected (Angeles 2000:20) 
Institutional Structures for People's Empowerment
Because urban poor settlers have been targeted for demolition, resented for taking over land illegally, and derided for their unsightly surroundings, the institutional arrangements of governance that should respond to their needs have not developed as quickly as needed. Just as micro-finance approaches have filled in the interstices between regular banks and informal moneylenders, so too do the particular needs of the urban poor need creative adaptation. It is not until a problem is raised to the level of consciousness, examined by those affected by it, and transformed into a new set of understandings conducive to practical action, that the institutional repercussions can be devised.
That is what organized urban poor groups have been doing for decades. Their resistance to eviction and refusal to return to their home town despite a one-way ticket home has forced governments to construct more humane and acceptable resettlement sites. The low priority the urban poor accord distant resettlement or high and medium rise housing compared to onsite or near-site residence and upgrading has meant after years of strife that government is coming around to seeing the picture in terms of the lives the poor actually live. Some of the newer or revitalized institutional structures and mechanisms illustrate the timeliness of this creative effort. Most cities now have an Urban Poor Affairs Office with a staff specifically expected to listen to and address the needs brought up. Listening to the urban poor is becoming more possible because their representatives sit on government committees, or meet with their Mayor and even the President with some regularity. City leaders hold public meetings and hearings, organize referendums, and open up city council meetings to interested parties. They publish their budgets for greater transparency and encourage the citizenry to examine them critically. The Social Security System and Philhealth in consultation with NGOs is making headway in develop systems that enable low-income earners and informal settlers to obtain social security and medicare. Computerized records now enable even less literate clients to obtain access on land titles in one visit. On the national level, urban poor representatives elected by their sector sit on the National Anti-Poverty Commission and propose ways in which national agencies can more effectively reach the poor.
A movement that has brought this turnaround in government about is community organizing. Building People's Organizations -democratic, autonomous, self-actualizing and able to make demands of those in authority -creates the pressure from below so necessary to make slowly moving bureaucratic processes move and recalcitrant officials listen. Only when poor people are able to overcome apathy and fear through taking action and then reflecting for renewed action, can they make the leap forward. From small, community focused issues, many go on to expand their horizons and participate in the national and international debate.
However, many urban poor settlers who mobilize to acquire land often relax once that has been accomplished, leaving to others the continuing search and struggle for new issues and broader systems to tackle. Labor organizer Honculada reflects on community organizing, "…organizing has empowered people on a micro-level; developed an awareness of democratic processes; offered alternative actions for people's organization and brought about personal transformation in the sense of collectivity and commitment." However, in stressing "process and peoples power," she adds, community organizing may constrain organized groups from rising above the level of issues in order to grapple with the deeper causes of social contradictions. In the same vein, Karaos (2003: 35) comments that by focusing on local benefits and linking with politicians eager to co-opt slum dwellers through patronage benefits, urban poor groups never move beyond to challenge unjust social structures through systemic urban land reform. She adds:
Populism and clientelism …share a common tendency which is their abhorrence for institutions and institutionalized channels of interest representation. Because of this, both of them end up reinforcing existing power relations. They so not encourage the formation of independent organizations with stable linkages to political institutions; instead they cultivate the dependence of subaltern groups on politicians who then act as their exclusive access to the political system. The challenge therefore is to find a way to connect the autonomously organized urban poor communities to either civil society formations or political parties that can provide institutionalized channels of access to representation in the power structures of society. If civil society groups and the progressive political parties cannot perform this role, the advancement of a social reform agenda by the progressive movement stands in danger of being subverted by autonomous community organizations acting solely on the basis of self-interest.
This sobering reflection is certainly apt. But perhaps a larger mass of autonomous, democratic groups is still needed before the critical mass can be reached capable of bringing about the structural reforms envisioned. One way of accelerating this process is to support community organizing and the training of thousands of community organizers to meet that challenge. 
